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The Meech Lake Accord was a watershed in both the  history of citizen-state relations in 
Canada and in the  history of attempts by Canadian political leaders to improve ethno-
cultural relations through institutional reform.  Freshly-minted  Charter  Canadians not 
only declined to be deferential to political elites;  their newfound activism  greatly 
complicated nearly every major aspect of the task at hand, most notably by exposing the 
anachronism of national dualism.  Although the Accord crystallized in the public mind 
longstanding provincial grievances concerning recognition of Quebec’s cultural 
distinctiveness, the role of the federal state in the social union, provincial rights 
concerning Senate and judicial appointments, and immigration, it is the disputes 
concerning  “process”—more specifically the precise balance of representation, 
consultation, deliberation, participation  and  direct decision-making to be shared 
between elites and citizens in constitutional negotiations --- that  loom largest in any 
explanation of the Accord’s demise,  and indeed of the country’s subsequent inability to 
achieve significant constitutional  or quasi-constitutional change  of any kind (outside of 
the courtroom). 
 
An important aspect of these popular and intellectual debates has been  the assumed 
compatibility of  deliberative democracy with direct (plebiscitary) democracy and 
participation as means of legitimating constitutional change or other major shifts of 
public policy.  This paper shall argue that elites have triangulated between  referenda, 
deliberative mechanisms and representative government in  response to the need for 
political legitimacy and in ways that are largely coloured by calculations of  self-interest 
and strategic bargaining. As a result, the objectives of constitutional reform—including 
ethnic comity and enhanced citizenship—have become more, rather than less,  difficult to 
attain.  The author proposes  that a more purely deliberative  model of institutional 
change is needed if progress is to made in managing moral and ethnic conflict and 
improving Canadian democracy. 
The paper  begins by examining  the early attempts to reconcile  the two 
contradictory legacies of the Constitution Act, 1982, a government-dominated process 
embodied in the new amending formula,  and a newly moblized and rights-conscious 
citizenry activated by the Charter. These attempts begin almost immediately after the 
conclusion of the Accord in April 1987 when the debate begins in earnest and continue 
until the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in a referendum  1992.  It  is argued that  
what emerges during this period is a  “deliberative gap”  between the extremes of 
executive dominance and plebiscitary democracy,  driven by the politics of 
legitimacy.The paper then  looks at the evolution of democratic theory over the same 
time period, with particular emphasis on the ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory.  
What makes  the theory of deliberative democracy especially relevant  to the Canadian 
situation  is its concern with  decision –making in contexts characterized by deep moral 
disagreement and  cultural diversity. While powerful criticisms have been made of  
particular versions of deliberative  theory by  critics  who claim that it either sells short 
diversity, sells short practice, or is insuficiently cognizant of power,   I shall argue that  
Canada’s present predicament  is as much about evasion of responsibility on the part of 
elected officials as it is about the marginalization of suppressed voices or the absence of 
proper conversational precepts for constitutional debate. If the disjunction between the 
weakened institutions of representation and the blunt instrument of referendum is the 
most glaring weakness in Canada’s  post-Meech Lake processes of  institutional reform  
and constitutional  change, then the remedy is likely to be found in improving either the 
deliberative capacity of represenative bodies, or improving the deliberative character of 
referenda. While both strategies have merit and and are  not mutually exclusive, it is 
submitted that it is the former strategy that has the greater potential.for success. 
Accordingly, the paper concludes with a specific recommendation for increasing the role 
for citizen deliberation and initiative,  while keeping legislators on the hook for actually 
enacting constitutional and quasi-constitutional reforms .  
 
The Meech Lake Accord and the New Politics of Constitutional Change Post-1982 
 
 
Peter Russell aptly described the generation of political leaders who devised the Meech 
Lake Accord as “practising elite accommodation within a system of consociational 
democracy” (Russell 1988: 104). This traditional style of federal-provincial bargaining, 
neatly summarized by Donald Smiley and others as “executive federalism”, is justified in 
the context of constitutional amendment by the need to secure the consent of both orders 
of government.  Furthermore, in a constitutional  negotiation concerned primarily with 
the country’s most fundamental and longstanding linguistic and cultural cleavage, the 
French-English axis of Canadian federalism, private accommodations among elites can 
be, and were,  seen as the only way to secure agreement in a way that minimized conflict 
(Lijphart, 1977).   
Be that as it may,  this perspective—identified  by Alan Cairns as the 
‘government’s constitution”—inevitably clashed with the alternative perspective, the 
“citizens’ constitution”.  The latter  may have had roots early in the post war period, as 
Cairns acknowledges, or may even be related to postmaterialist value change, as Neil 
Nevitte avers.  But the speed and strength of its development, and the precise form that it 
took, was undoubtedly a result of the  enactement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.  Opinion polls confirmed that the salience and legitimacy of arguments based 
on individual rights had grown, as citizens became defined as bearers of  Charter rights. 
Furthermore, groups that had been accorded specific constitutional status in the Charter 
(women, aboriginals, official language minorities, ethnic minorities, and historically 
disadvantaged groups listed in the equality rights provision) pointed to these sections of 
the Charter in parliamentary committees and in the media in order to claim their standing 
as constitutional actors and to ground their arguments (Cairns 1988: 125-127). This 
frustrated culture of participation reflected a deep incoherence in the constitutional order, 
best described by Cairns as the unhappy marriage in 1982 of two incompatible 
institutional logics, that of the Charter and that of the amending formula: 
 
With the benefit of hindsight it is evident that the scholarly concentration on the 
Charter as the major outcome of 1982 underestimates the significance of the 
amending formula, with its capacity to change the constitution by a collective fait 
accompli of governments and derisory public input. ...The fact that both the 
federal government and the citizen groups they mobilized on their side in 1980-81 
were much less aggressive in struggling for citizen input in the amending formula 
than in battling for a stronger Charter has led to the present constitutional 
incoherence in which these two legacies of 1982 speak to Canadians with very 
different voices, and contradictory messages (Cairns 1988:123). 
 
 
An often overlooked aspect of this incoherence  was that elite attitudes toward the rights 
revolution were highly selective, alternately amplifying, muffling and channeling popular 
demands in accordance with political agendas.  The famous denunciation of the Meech 
Lake Agreement as having been made in private by “eleven men in suits”  was largely 
absent, and easily ignored, just five years earlier. As  Garth Stevenson wryly observed in 
his review of the Meech Lake literature,  
 
“...it is inexcusable, particularly for Pierre Trudeau,  not to acknowledge that the 
process is the only possible process under the amending formula to which 
Trudeau and nine provincial premiers  agreed in November 1981. I argued for a 
more democratic process of amendment in the Canadian Forum in 1981, in a 
book published in 1982, at a conference at the University of Western Ontario in 
1983, and in Socialist Studies in 1984. No one at the time paid the slightest 
attention, other than to repeat Bill Bennett’s assertion that executive federalism 
was “the Canadian way.” Now everyone wants to shut the stable door, long after 
the horse has escaped.”(Stevenson 1988: 175) 
 
Even more stingingly,  Stevenson found some ”disturbing parallels between the 
revolutionaries and the ancien regime. Some of the opponents of Meech Lake, 
particularly the feminists and spokesmen for various ethnic minorities, are just as 
paranoid about constitutional change, as obsessed with their own parochial interests, and 
as illogical in their arguments, as the provincialists who opposed the Victoria amending 
formula and the Charter in 1981. ...The argument that the distinct society clause threatens 
gender equality, or that limiting the spending power will prevent the funding of daycare, 
are oddly reminiscent of the arguments, heard seven or eight years ago, that the Charter 
was a threat to property rights or that the Victoria formula would deprive Alberta of its 
oil.” (Stevenson 1988: 174).  Stevenson’s comment that the discourse on popular 
participation was being shaped by and subordinated to power politics had roots  that  
went back at least as far as the Parti Quebecois’ etapisme and strategies surrounding the 
timing and wording of the  1980  referendum on “sovereignty-association”. The novelty 
of the Meech debate was that this pervasive constitutional paranoia, as Cairns put it , was 
multiplied and extended to non-state actors who no longer had to rely upon one of the 
two levels of government as their principal mouthpiece.  (Cairns: 1988 134).  
This resulted in a further complication, namely the asymmetry between Quebec 
and the rest of Canada in terms of the electorate’s identification with the provincial state 
in interprovincial bargaining. While not untouched by cultural pluralism or the rights 
revolution, the province’s francophone majority was quite willing to back its 
government’s   demands for more provincial autonomy, even when those demands 
largely took the form of prerogatives and powers of first ministers.  The questionable 
constitutional legitimacy of the Canadian Charter in Quebec was deftly handled by the 
Parti Quebecois government between 1982 and 1985, which routinely invoked the section 
33 notwithstanding clause in the federal Charter, while not invoking the same clause in 
its provincial Charter.  The relative indifference of Charter Canadians  to the 
repercussions in Quebec of rejecting what were seen as “minimum” demands was 
matched by widespread indifference among nationalist Quebecois to particularistic 
demands of individual provinces or groups within English Canada,  or to the charges of 
elitism levelled at the agreement.  The two solitudes spoke in plain French and plain 
English, but not to each other. 
 It should already have been apparent (and was apparent to the most astute constitutional 
observers, such as Cairns and Stevenson) that simply allowing more participants into a 
competitive zero-sum game for constitutional status was not going to be an easy or 
straightforward solution to the Meech Lake impasse. However much the failure of the 
Accord could be attributed to a democratic deficit, simply “democratizing” the 
constitutional change process could be no guarantee of success.  Greater attention to the 
aforementioned incoherencies, overlapping interests, blind spots and asymmetries was 
needed. Nevertheless, Canada’s ever-responsive prime minister, Brian Mulroney,  
pressed ahead with characteristic alacrity and determination, promising  that “Next time 
I’ll consult and I’ll consult and I’ll consult and I’ll wear the Canadian public out. I will 
not leave one voice unheard” (quoted in Bothwell 1995: 217). Certainly, the 
constitutional reform process that characterized the “Canada Round” over the next two 
years included a great deal of popular consultation and participation, including: 
legislative hearings in every province, a travelling commission of inquiry, a series of 
semi-public conferences, and two simultaneous referenda, one in Quebec (in which 55.4 
percent of voters rejected the  Charlottetown Accord) and one in the rest of Canada (in 
which 54.2 percent of voters ultimately rejected the Accord).  The failure of the Canada 
Round apparently left a bitter taste in mouths of Quebecers and Canadians alike, with the 
former nearly voting to leave the country in a referendum on sovereignty, and the latter 
collectively taking an indefinite leave of absence from mega-constitutional reform.i 
 
Discussion of a possible middle ground between ordinary representative processes and 
the use of referenda began with the laments expressed by constitutional observers about 
the anemic role of parliamentarians and legislators in the amending process,  and (as the 
failure of Meech led to the Charlottetown process), worries about   how best to manage 
the newly unleashed forces of popular participation by interest groups and an expanding 
constitutional agenda. Alan Cairns, noting that no aspect of the federal government’s 
1980 constitutional package attracted as much hostility as the referendum proposal,  
argued that the best that could be hoped for in the short run was a strengthened role for 
parliamentarians in the amending process,  greater involvement of citizens in the 
committee hearings of all 11 federal and provincial jurisdictions, and a greater degree of 
tentativeness in governmental agreements. Governments  could have modified the 
amending process without resort to the amendment procedure, i.e. they would have been 
“simple acts of political will”.  ...”While the viability of this halfway house between 
Meech Lake and referenda is unclear, it would unquestionably be a step in the right 
direction” (Cairns 1988: 142-43). 
    
Katherine Swinton, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Toronto 
Law School,  later expressed  dismay at the growth of the constitutional agenda in the 
“Canada Round”, noting that “it is time to discuss proposed changes to the constitution in 
a disciplined and focused manner  .ii In an article on “The Lessons From Meech Lake”  in 
the University of Toronto Law Journal in 1992, Swinton argued that it was important to 
recognize that any expansion of public participation would have to take place “within the 
present constitutional structure”. Noting that leading scholars such as Peter Hogg 
(Swinton 1992:155-57) and Peter Russell (158-63) were championing ambitious 
proposals for referenda and constituent assemblies respectively, she argued that in order 
to be able to evaluate such proposals, it was first necessary to distinguish between the 
three stages of the amendment process: formulation of positions, negotiation of an 
amendment, and ratification.  
 
“The lesson from Meech Lake is not that the people wanted in at ratification, 
because they were there—in interest-group appearances before legislative 
committees, letter-writing campaigns, and polling results. The real resentment 
was directed at an earlier stage, when the negotiations first occurred with regard 
to the general content and then the language of the amendment. If there is a desire 
to be involved, this is the stage that requires change.”(158)    
 
Yet the outcomes of Russell’s constituent assembly are as contingent upon the 
variables of timing, wording, context and political machination as  are the potential 
outcomes of Hogg’s referenda and initiatives.  Swinton, like Cairns, is not musing about 
an abandonment of  constitutional policy formulation and negotiation in favour of some 
purer expression of popular sovereignty, the precise nature of which we are unlikely to 
agree upon.  Rather, the emphasis is upon a more measured insistence that the reform 
process must “bring in the public at every stage—formulation, negotiation and 
ratification—and demonstrate respect for citizens’ views”(168, emphasis added).  
Bargaining, trade-offs, and compromise   remain crucial;  but Swinton points out that the 
analogy between Meech Lake and collective bargaining always did a disservice to the 
latter. In fact,  wise union negotiators generally keep in close touch with the bargaining 
unit with a view to ratification; at Meech Lake the ‘bargaining unit’ did not get adequate 
respect (160). As we shall see, the normative status of ‘bargaining’ and the question of 
what best combines reasoned discussion with  popular input into representative processes 
of negotiation are important issues in contemporary democratic theory. 
Cairns in 1988 and Swinton in 1991-92 were  representative of  two groups of 
constitutional scholars just three years apart, both decrying the lack of a middle ground, 
but who were speaking from opposite sides of a chasm. Those writing during the Meech 
Lake debate feared an executive domination so complete that the constitutional revisions 
might lack legitimacy in  large parts of the country. Those writing during the 
Charlottetown process feared a surfeit of ostensibly legitimating features—a much 
expanded agenda, consultations prior to negotiations, and a referendum campaign for 
ratification—would prove either too difficult to negotiate or too difficult to sell across the 
country.  Both fears proved to be warranted. Subsequent constitutional changes that relied 
upon Section 43 , “Amendments relating to some but not all provinces”—on bilingualism 
in New Brunswick in 1993 (without a referendum),  and the Inuit referendum ratifying 
the creation of Nunavut  in 1992—showed  that constitutional reform could still happen, 
provided that (1) complex or potentially divisive issues were handled through 
deliberative bodies or (2) issues submitted to referendum were not overly complex or 
divisive.  But larger issues of more general import, concerning the nature of  the 
Canadian state, citizenship, or civic identity, remain unresolved due to the lack of a stable 
middle ground of accountable and deliberative representation. In short, the haphazard 
politics of legitimation has run aground owing to a lack of intellectual coherence between 
its discrepant elements of representative, deliberative and plebiscitary democracy. 
 
Unfortunately,  as Johnston, Blais, Gidengil and Nevitte describe in their analysis 
of the Charlottetown referendum, (1996) the politics of referral in several Canadian 
provinces were motivated by the damage already done to political elites by the Meech 
Lake debate, and the need for a “safety valve” to avoid further deligitimation through 
divided parties and political opponents bent on harnessing populist backlash. “At one 
point or another, the sequence from Meech Lake to Charlottetown  embodied every 
tactical move ever seen in referendum history, in Canada or elsewhere”   (Johnston et.al 
1996: 258).  The need for referenda as legitimation for major constitutional change thus 
became well established in the early nineties, but not because of the inherent suitability of 
referenda for ratifying  complex compromises for  divided societies. In fact, the  
established literature dating from the 1970s suggested that rule by simple majority 
presupposes underlying socio-political unity; more segmented societies require more 
consensual or proportional decision rules coupled with elite accommodation to maintain 
their integrity. As Johnston et..al observe, “Even when , as in 1992,  a referendum’s rules 
are super-majoritarian, direct votes are brutal in their transparency.” (Johnston et. al 
1996: 252).  Yet, the post –Meech environment could be described as one in which elite 
accommodation had broken down and the purgative ritual of externalizing intra-party and 
intra-regional divisons  through referenda and citizens’ assemblies was deemed to be 
salutary.  The more recent failures to achieve quasi-constitutional reform of the electoral 
system in Ontario and British Columbia display a similar  disjunction to Charlottetown, 
but with an added element of elite abstention.  In both cases, the noble stated rationale of 
having a citizens’ assembly in order to avoid conflict of interest on the part of politicians 
was accompanied by the slightly ignoble device of a 60% threshold for ratification by the 
public and the politically convenient luxury for the politicians of not having to deliberate, 
or even publicly weigh in. Why was it not sufficient to apply the “conflict of interest” 
rationale at the  agenda-setting/policy formulation stage of the process, and then kick the 
ball back to the legislature for refinement and debate? Then , instead of protecting itself 
from the public through barriers to majority voting, the legislature would have to do  so 
through the more finely-tuned and deliberative instruments of legislative debate and 
amendment.  
One wonders how a more purely deliberative process, giving the 
recommendations of the citizens’ assemblies the status of a legislative initiative that 
would then have to be debated and voted by the legislature, would have been handled by 
the politicians of British Columbia and Ontario. How legitimate would their ultimate 
decisions have been, if politicians were still  ‘on the hook’?  Surely the point of 
deliberative democrats is that legislatures would have to defend with reasons any 
departure from the Citizens’ Assembly recommendations to a skeptical public---and 
under such conditions the public might be expected to identify more with the Citizens’ 
Assembly than they have in recent referendum campaigns, precisely because their 
skepticism would then be focused on the elected politicians. Would a vote of the federal 
Parliament on, say, the  Law Commission’s recommendations for electoral reform any 
longer be considered legitimate? My guess is that it would, at least until constitutencies 
disfavoured by the proposal began to mobilize public opinion in favour of a referendum. 
That is because electoral reform might not be considered a change of sufficient scope or 
magnitude to warrant recourse to a national referendum. (It is difficult to avoid the  
precedent established for a referendum in the current political context, however.) 
There are many observations that can be made in trying to make sense of the 
double failure of Meech and Charlottetown. Adding a three –year ratification period to 
the Meech Lake Accord, was intended to be legitimating, but the terms and 
understandings of the Accord itself were so clearly in the rigid form of a fait accompli –
willing to recognize only “egregious” errors while reserving to the 11 original 
governments the sole right to determine what “egregious” meant.  Changes in 
government in four provinces, all of which had growing constitutencies with reservations 
about the Accord led to more open and meaningful legislative processes, most famously 
of course in Manitoba and Newfoundland. But when coupled with a rigid and virtually 
unchangeable agreement, such innovations merely had the effect of  building political 
pressures without building in a safety valve, dooming the Accord. 
Many of these  same pressures spilled over into the very different debacle of 
Charlottetown.  While the vast and rapid expansion of constitutionally –recognized actors 
was legitimating and probably necessary, the concomitant expansion of the constitutional 
agenda was driven by several logics that were at odds with a succesful result.  One was 
the tendency to parcel and delegate pieces of the constitutional agenda to particular 
stakeholders whose priority it was to achieve that particular gain, without sufficient 
consideration of how it would affect the external or secondary preferences of others. This 
may have been enough to pacify those groups and provinces who had been anxious to 
exercise their newfound constitutional muscle  to scuttle  the Meech Lake Accord , and 
who were now signatories to Charlottetown.  But it could not be safely assumed to satisfy 
ordinary citizens, who also had newfound constitutional muscles to flex. Another factor 
was the aforementioned usage by provincial territorial, aborignal and party leaders of the 
referendum device as a safety valve for externalizing and evading conflicts and divisions 
within provinces, parties and interest groups.  No doubt an awareness that there would be 
a referendum  further down the road made it easier to make concessions, but not 
necessarily the concessions conducive to a “yes” vote on referendum day.   
As Avigail Eisenberg has perceptively written, referenda have their own implicit 
institutional logic, one that runs counter to the politics of difference. “[I]n employing a 
referendum as a means to resolve a pressing issue, governments or elites legitimize the 
referendum as the appropriate way  to decide the issue and in so doing legitimize the 
particular understanding of political equality that underpins the democratic idea of 
referendums.  This understanding requires that each voter be given the same amount of 
political power in making the decision at hand because each has a similar stake in the 
decision. ...”(Eisenberg 2001:  150). Eisenberg goes on to explain that while referendums 
contain a logic  that favours minority rights claims for similar treatment, drawing upon an 
undifferentiated  conception of equality, they are a not a favourable medium for claims 
based upon a differentiated conception of equality.   
 
Notice that Eisenberg’s analysis applied differently to different parts of  the 
Charlottetown Accord, in accordance to the kind and degree of differentiation being 
claimed. Constitutional elites at the bargaining stage treated  at least three expressions of 
minority rights claim as equivalent or commensurate entities that could be balanced or 
traded off against each other:  the distinct society clause, the Triple E Senate and the 
guarantee of 25% of House of Commons seats.  The first presents a modest threshold for 
educational or deliberative processes to clear in a majoritarian vote:  this merely involves 
explaining the need to recognize national minorities in a constitution that already 
enshrines minority education, multiculturalism and section 35 aboriginal rights, 
something that highly educated voters were already inclined to accept, according to the 
polls(Johnston et.a l996: 281). The second presents a  higher and more difficult threshold 
but was probably possible to justify in light of the “everyone is a minority” argument and 
the need to balance representation by population and the potential for tyranny of the 
majority that it represents.  But the  Quebec representation guarantee in the House of 
Commons flouts the undifferentiated conception of equality precisely in the institution 
where it ought to matter most. Here , the hurdle to educative and deliberative processes 
may well have been prohibitive, because even more information, reflection and 
discussion on the part of voters probably would  not have increased their inclination to 
ratify.  There is evidence for this in the studies by Johnston, Blais, Gigdengil and Nevitte:  
“Our analyses suggest that removing the 25 percent guarantee might have brought the 
Charlottetown Accord closer to success. Of course, this also necessarily implies 
removing the Senate provisions, making the deal look much more like its predecessor, the 
Meech Lake Accord....[i]n that event, more thoughtful voters might win out. In 1992,  
thoughtful voters did not form a distinctive constituency for the Yes.” (279, 285). The 
irony that a modified Meech Lake would have been easier to ratify than Charlottetown is 
worth dwelling upon. 
 
While Charlottetown represented an advance in terms of recognizing difference, it 
also represented a descent into factionalism and group politics.  In the language of 
contemporary democratic theory, Charlottetown might look like good step in the right 
direction from the standpoint of  representative or associative democracy (because of the 
much .broader range of powerful and influential actors, representing a wide range of 
citizens),  but a step in the wrong direction from the standpoint of deliberative 
democracy, which was attenuated by the referendum campaign,  or even from the 
standpoint of  plebiscitary ( direct ) democracy, because political compromises  achieved 
through the multiplied accentuation of difference isn’t the sort of thing that sells well in a 
referendum. 
.     
The Deliberative Turn in Democratic Theory  
 
Eisenberg’s observations about the meaning of democratic equality in complex societies 
are good places to begin a reflection on the development of democratic theory over the 
past two or three decades. The growth of new social movements in the west, along with 
the collapse of Communist in eastern and central Europe, spawned a new interest in civil 
society within national boundaries and the prospects for cosmopolitan democracy beyond 
them.   Associative theorists such as Paul Hirst and Joshua Cohen have attempted to 
reclaim the egalitarian project of social democracy through such non-state mechanisms as 
worker participation and cooperatives (Carter 2002). Continuing processes of 
decolonization, when combined with the fall of communism and globalization, helped to 
constitute “The Third Wave ‘ of Democratization’ (Huntington 1991).  Certainly 
recognition of difference and inclusion has also been important to democratic theory and 
practice, including greater recognition of gender, indigenous groups, and nationalism.  
The most important recent developments in democratic theory have had to reckon with 
identity politics in both of its main forms: where ethnic, racial or other groups seek 
greater equality and inclusion in libeal democratic politics; and where those groups seek 
protection of their identities against erosion through recognition,autonomy or self-
government(Young 1990, 2000; Frazer 2002; Canovan 2002).  In a nutshell,  the sudden 
and unexpected rise in the number of democracies in the world  has led to a rise of 
interest in the study of democracy, which in turn has sparked a renewed interst in 
democracy’s underlying  theoretical difficulties. Happily, deliberative democrats and 
other democratic theorists have been increasingly concerned with  decision –making in 
contexts characterized by deep moral disagreement and  cultural diversity, which is why 
it is not surprising that several Canadian political theorists—notably James Tully, Simone 
Chambers, Alain Noel, Charles Taylor, Charles Blattberg and Will Kymlicka—have 
made important contributions to democratic theory during the past two decades. 
In On Political Equality(2006), Robert Dahl argues that belief in democracy as a 
goal or ideal implies viewing political equality as a goal or ideal as well. Since 
philosophers from Aristotle to Rousseau and beyond have generally viewed an ideal 
society as being characterized by active citizen engagement with others in pursuit of , and 
debates about the common good (90), we should accept the view that political equality is 
an ideal that we should strive to attain (49).  But he accepts  that realization of this ideal 
faces formidable barriers, some of which are rising around the world and some of which 
are falling (75-77).  The chief barrier  in the United States  and other advanced western 
democracies comes from the baneful effects of consumerism and capitalism on the 
culture of citizenship. Yet he holds out hope that political inequality may decline as more 
and more citizens pass the “quality of life  threshold”(109): 
 
  “...[A]s more Americans discover the hollowness inherent in our culture  
of competitive consumerism and the rewards and challenges of  active and 
engaged citizenship, they might well begin to move the United States 
considerably closer to that distant and elusive goal” (120).  
 
The normative purposes claimed for democracy can be seen as falling into two 
main camps, one congenial to capitalist mass market culture the other less so.  The 
tradition of  aggregative democracy regards  the preferences of individuals as given and 
concerns itself with how best to reveal and count those preferences in order to discover 
the common good.  The only political equality required in this view is the equal right to 
vote and run for office. The tradition of deliberative democracy is defined  “as a form of 
government in which free and equal citizens and their representatives justify decisions in 
a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and 
generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present 
on all citizens but open to challenges in the future.” (Gutmann and Thompson 2004:7).  It  
is concerned with the formation of citizens’  preferences in order to create the common 
good.  This is done by expanding the use of  deliberative reasoning among citizens. The  
legal and moral outcomes of these deliberations are considered legitimate “if and only if  
they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement  among equals” (Cohen) or  if  
“all affected persons could agree [to them]  as participants in rational discourses” 
(Habermas). “What distinguishes deliberative democracy from most of its predecessors is  
the view that democracy requires not only equality of votes, but also equal and effective 
opportunity to participate in processes of collectve judgement” (Warren 2002: 174).  In 
other words,  the ideal of deliberative democracy is premised upon a more radical  form 
of political equality than is commonly found in more liberal minimalist/aggregative 
forms of  democracy. This is true even of the less radical proceduralist  deliberative 
theories, such as  that of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson: 
 
‘Even if, as one critic [Frederick Schauer] suggests, “all of the inequalities of 
society in general” were “replicated in the content of deliberation,” it would not 
discredit deliberation. The process of deliberation  as we understand it here is self-
constraining; its own defining principles provide a basis for criticising the unjust 
inequalities that affect the process (Democracy and Disagreement 1996: 17).’ 
 
The greater capacity of various forms of deliberative democracy to recognize and 
give expression to complex and differentiated equality provides us with an important clue 
to explaining  the ‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory and practice in recent decades.  
Deliberative democrats argue that existing liberal democratic arrangements are not 
sufficiently sensitive to the problems associated with  pluralism, complexity and 
inequality in modern societies. Although liberal minimalism and aggregative democracy  
(and even their more participatory cousin, direct democracy) are founded upon the 
principle of political equality, they militate against a robust view of active and informed 
citizenship. Furthermore, they are inimical to reconciling conflicts that flow from, or are 
exacerbated by, deep social divisions. The traditional model of active liberal citizenship, 
civic republicanism, suffers from a different set of problems: an exclusive definition of 
community, an affinity for elitism and for smaller and more homogeneous communities, 
and an ideal of the common good that aims at preserving the fundamental characteristics 
of the republic, i.e. ruling out options that would transform its basic character (Carter & 
Stokes 34).  Thus, a large reason for deliberative democracy’s ascendancy is its comfort 
level with  identity politics and new social movements ----  its emphasis on pluralism, 
whether of people or of ideas---and its tolerance of moral conflict and disagreement.iii 
Characterizations of  deliberative democracy  show an interesting variation.  In 
Carter & Stokes’ survey of contemporary democratic theory Democratic Theory Today 
(2002) , most of the contributors are fairly dismissive of “post-modernism” and the 
“radical democratic pluralism”, stating that Michel Foucault and his followers “would 
argue that democratic theory is simply another regime of truth facilitating the governing 
and disciplining of populations”(Carter & Stokes 2002: 10); and that “a compelling 
critique of the radical pluralist argument might therefore be found in its ambivalence 
towards the very conditions –the rule of law and sovereignty—that make democracy (at 
whatever level) possible”. Mark Warren’s chapter on deliberative democracy in this book 
therefore relies on the work of Jurgen Habermas, whose theory is radical enough to 
suggest ‘equal and effective opportunity  to participate in processes of will formation’, 
while still being rooted in existing liberal values, practices  and institutions.  Although 
these writers’  commitment to working through existing institutions to realize both liberal 
and democratic values is commendable, their version of deliberative democracy has 
drawn a lot of fire from First Nations scholars, radical pluralists and other philosophers of 
democracy.   
An example  is Glen Coulthard’s critique of Seyla Benhabib’s  The Claims of 
Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, which   takes aim at her anti-
essentialist, social constructivist approach to culture and identity politics.  Benhabib 
argues in her work that pluralism (the existence of different cultures) can be rendered 
compatible with cosmopolitanism (the Kantian and Habermasian ideal of world 
citizenship) provided that the conditions of  egalitarian reciprocity (equal rights for 
minorities), voluntary self-ascription (individuals can choose the communities that they 
wish to be members of ) and freedom of exit and association are fulfilled.  “Intercultural 
justice between human groups should be defended in the name of justice and freedom and 
not of an elusive preservation of cultures” (Benhabib  2002:8). Cultural recognition in 
Benhabib’s view is to be achieved through the “inclusion” of  traditionally marginalized 
groups into a widening “democratic dialogue” with the citizens of the surrounding 
society.  This recognition and inclusion comes with some strings attached, however: 
cultural norms and practices and boundaries must be contestable in accordance with the 
three normative conditions. The cultural preservationism associated with cultural 
essentialism  is, in Benhabib’s view, inherently rigid and restrictive and prone to 
becoming repressive, inegalitarian or exclusionary.  
Coulthard, a Dene (First Nations) political theorist, points out that Benhabib’s 
opposite strategy of  anti-essentialism will not necessarily solve the problem of inequality 
or pave the way to a successful emancipatory politics.  That is because (1) her  
condemnation of exclusionary practices can sometimes misidentify  essentialist identity 
claims  rather than context of colonial relationships as the  primary source of those 
practices, (Coulthard 2010: 143-146);  and (2) indigenous activists may legitimately wish 
to employ essentialist notions of culture and identity in order to critique oppressive power 
relations and transcend forms of colonial exploitation and domination ( 146-148).  An 
example of the former mistake is the case of women reinstated by Bill C-31 but not 
afforded full band membership by some First Nations communities (whether because of 
sexist prejudices, political self-interest or practical motivations relating to the effect a 
mandated increase in membership has on the capacity of some small communities).  In 
such a case, Native womens’  legal victories have only been the narrow and hollow ones 
of equal access to a colonial system of band membership and Indian registration.  
Examples of the second  kind can be found  in  Patricia Monture-Angus’s and Bonita 
Lawrence’s proposals for regeneration of matriarchal and kinshiop governance structures 
as a strategy of reparation and resistance to patriarchal relations enforced by the Indian 
Act; or in Taiake Alfred’s critiques of universalist notions of capitalism and so-called 
progress.  Coulthard, following Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri as well as other critics 
of social constructivism, makes a persuasive claim: “[t}hat by employing the so-called 
social fact of cultural fluidity, narrativity, and contestability as a standard against which 
democratic theorists, judges, policy makers, and the state ought to assess the legitimacy 
of claims for recognition, Benhabib’s theory potentially sanctions the very forms of 
power and discrimination that anti-essentialist democratic projects are supposed to 
undercut” (149). 
Not that these criticisms constitute a full-blown defence of  cultural essentialism, 
which runs into its own problems of authenticity and “true” representation.  The point 
must be that any approach to democracy – be it essentialist or non-essentialist, 
liberal/pluralist or  radical/post-structuralist, or indeed whether it accepts or eschews the 
label “deliberative”—cannot lose sight of  relations of power as the most fundamental 
object of analysis.  This probably implies more than just an intellectual appreciation that 
discourse cannot be understood outside of its constitutive context of power (Noel  
2006:432-433); it may also imply that any approach to democratic practice and 
institutional design that attempts to do so is likely to “undercut” the achievement of either 
authentic equality of participation or emancipation from historical structures of 
domination.    
This failing may even prove to be true of  Charles Blattberg’s  claimed alternative 
to deliberative democracy, which recommends a “conversational” mode of dialogue that 
takes aim  at  truly reconciling  conflicts and differences as opposed to  either the  
“monarchist” trumps of constitutional rules or “polyarchist” bargaining of compromises 
that aim at nothing more than“accommodation.”  Blattberg  paints a compelling picture of 
how the “patriotic” politics that he envisages is more likely to lead to a politics of the 
common good –and a polity the constitution of which is made up of “expressive “ rules in 
the Wittgensteinian sense , i.e. rules firmly rooted in our shared practices and more open 
to the possibility of “real integration between the communities concerned”(Blattberg 
2003: 100-101).  Shall We Dance? A Patriotic Politics for Canada  is at the very least a 
very useful reminder of how the strategies and mechanisms that we have developed for 
coping with diversity and disagreement can cause us to unwittingly perpetuate and 
exacerbate conflict and miss opportunities for shared understanding and common 
endeavour.  But his critiques of both Trudeau’s Charter-centred pan-Canadianism and 
Mulroney’s quintessential polyarchal bargaining at Meech Lake and Charlottetown, while 
extremely illuminating, also show how patriotic politics risks leaving out as much as the 
alternatives.  
According to Trudeau, a major  purpose of the Charter was to combat the 
“centrifugal forces that were thereatening to break the federation apart” (Trudeau 
1990:362). Blattberg notes with irony that the Charter itself is fundamentally centrifugal: 
“[f]or rights encourage negotiation, that adversarial form of dialogue that is all about 
balancing the terms of a conflict against each other rather than integrating or reconciling 
them. ...To assert rights, then, is to take an adversarial stance, and there is no conversing 
with an adversary...And if there is no place for conversation,  then there is no room to 
affirm the public common good that, unlike some abstract theory of justice, constitutes 
the true integrity of a citizenry” (Blattberg 2003: 87-88).  Rights talk is part of a 
“neutralist theory of justice that leaves no room for the recognition of nationhood”(70), 
another aspect of Trudeau’s  “monarchist” doctrine.(74).  One wonders, however, 
whether a search for common ground between Trudeau and Levesque could have led to 
reconciliation, or whether expressive rules operating as substitutes for rights could 
provide the kind of security for minorities that in turn is a foundation for dialogue 
between equals.  Quebec nationalists are now less angry, while other Canadians  feel less 
shocked and threatened by the prospect of secession and have begun to think about the 
meaning of “English Canada”(Resnick 1994). Both  groups are more cosmopolitan in 
outlook than ever before. We are arguably in a far better position to engage in patriotic 
conversation about the common good today than we were twenty years ago in the highly 
charged atmosphere of Meech Lake and its aftermath; but paradoxically (from the 
standpoint of patriotic theory) that is largely because of the Charter of Rights, section 35 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 and Bill 101 (The Quebec Language Charter). The legal 
rights created by these  statutes have had both the direct effect of creating greater security 
for cultural and national minorities and the indirect effect of creating greater awareness 
of, and respect for, other groups in the larger political culture—despite the heightened 
adversarialism that results whenever the boundaries of those rights are being tested or 
contested. (Since that legal contestation will also arise when the boundaries of expressive 
rules are being applied as well, it should perhaps not be seen, even by Blattberg, as a 
disqualifying attribute.) 
This ineluctability of legal rules and procedures underlies any discussion of  
democratic theory or constitutional politics.  Blattberg criticizes  deliberative or 
discursive democrats such as Alain Noel and Mark Kingwell for relying upon a 
“neutralist theory of conversation” and “regulative rather than expressive procedures” for 
judging the quality of deliberations (30-31); Jospeh Carens and  Samuel La Selva for 
(“confusingly”) conflating conversation  and bargaining, as when they call for 
“negotiations...as a way of pursuing mutual understanding”(31); and even Charles Taylor, 
Jeremy Webber, and James Tully  are criticized,  since “their failure to distinguish 
adequately between conversation and negotiation ultimately leads to pluralism tout 
court”(32).  In other words, pluralism is an unattractive concept, since it implies non-
ideal and un-patriotic compromises,  so ‘deep pluralism’, which makes common ground  
and durable expressive rules even more difficult to achieve, can hardly be much of an 
improvement.   
In contrast,  I  prefer to see all three  groups  of theorists Blattberg refers to as 
“deliberative” in the broadest sense of the word, although the latter group are of course 
more wary and skeptical of  what might get left out—or smuggled in-- under the 
authority of “reasons’  “procedures” and “justifications” of government . They differ not 
only in terms of their modes of dialogue, but in what they see as the challenges posed by 
varying political contexts to the quality of democratic practices—in particular, the 
relationship  between reason and power (Noel  2006). An unwillingness to completely 
part company with the language of interest and bargaining is sometimes rooted in an 
acute sensitivity to power and its attendant inequalities.  To be sure, procedures and 
principles developed for the purpose of regulating conflict need to be regarded as 
provisional and revised in the light of power’s imbalances, effects,  and marginalizations-
--as well as in the light of their potentials for achieving full reconciliation and realizing 
alternative possibilities. But to jettison them altogether may be to make the perfect the 
enemy of the good (after all: might not rights-claims be necessary to establish which 
identities and intersts are worthy of expression in the first place?)  And in order  to 
provisionally secure the good, both liberal legalists and radical pluralists may have 
something indispensable to contribute.  
According to John Dryzek,  deliberative democracy has roots in two distinct 
traditions --Anglo-American liberal constitutionalism  and European  critical theory–
which have recently met on  largely liberal terms, largely thanks to Jurgen Habermas in 
Europe and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson in America ( Dryzek 2000: 8-17).   But 
unlike Carter, Stokes & Warren et.al, he laments this convergence, arguing that we need 
to retrieve the critical edge of deliberative democracy by distinguishing between liberal 
constitutionalist and discursive strands  of deliberative theory; the latter is necessary if 
there is to be any continued quest for democratic authenticity (i.e. substantive rather than 
symbolic democratic control and actual citizen engagement and competence).    
Nevertheless, Dryzek gives liberal constitutionalists full credit for using 
deliberative theory to reconcile liberal and democratic elements of constitutionalism: by 
stressing how deliberative principles can justify liberal rights; by describing how liberal 
constitutions promote deliberation; and by describing constitution-making itself as a 
deliberative process.  In particular, Gutmann and Thompson get credit for understanding  
and accepting the presence of deep moral disagreement: “They do not expect deliberation 
to produce consensus, but they do expect it to yield understanding and mutual respect, 
thus making even deep moral conflicts on issues such as abortion more tractable (17).” 
What Dryzek and other discursive theorists insist, however,  is that there is a need to curb 
strategic interest-based bargaining; allow and even  encourage  a plurality of contesting 
discourses;  allow different kinds of communication beyond the rational communication 
privileged in western cultures; and recognize that the best way to learn such values as 
reciprocity, publicity and accountability is through the process of deliberation itself, 
rather than as stipulated pre-conditions of entry to the forum.  In addition, true critical 
theories  are distinguished by their attention to extra-constitutional agents of democratic 
influence; since Habermas sees law-making as the only rightful mechanism for 
transforming public opinion into administrative decision, he is disqualified from calling 
himself a critical theorist, according to Dryzek (26-27). 
Whether or not James Tully would accept the label of “discourse theorist” in 
Dryzek’s sense,  he neatly avoids  both  the  criticism of  theorising “above” or “outside” 
of practice  and the criticism (levelled by Habermas and others  at ‘contextualist’ 
thinkers) of being  “context-bound”.He does this by using  Foucauldian genealogy  to 
examine  and “problematise” existing practices and then using a combination of insights 
derived from both Foucault and Wittgenstein in order  to describe activities of 
intellectuals and citizens that are at the same time ‘context transgressing without being 
context transcending’  (Tully, along with Stanley Cavell, Chantal Mouffe and a few 
others, has helped to rescue Wittgenstein from a conservative reading that would root 
rule-following  in some ungrounded proposition or hegemonic practice that would be 
inimical to revision. Tully 2008a: 52-53.) Tully's stated aim is "to establish pedagogical 
relationships of reciprocal elucidation between academic research and the civic activities 
of fellow citizens"(.3). He calls this style of theory "public philosophy", the purpose of 
which is "to throw a critical light on the field of practices in which civic struggles take 
place and the practices of civic freedom available to change them"(.3). The reason this 
philosophy is distinctive is that it eschews the traditional approach of theorizing in a 
manner that is detached from relationships of normativity and power in which citizens 
find themselves. It is described as being 'in a new key' in that Tully is combining 
"historical studies and a reciprocal civic relationship" in his own unique style(9); 
implicitly, he is inviting us to do the same.   
Foucault's conception of a "discourse" refers to the sets of rules governing the 
"validity" of statements and the classification of objects of analysis and how they are 
organized into a system of possibility for knowledge. He thus situates, relativizes, and 
replaces traditional units of analysis such as the "text" the "theory" and the "research 
programme". His method is to ask what rules permit certain statements or truth-claims to 
be made--e.g. systems of classifying animals discussed in The Order of Things or the 
classification of psychiatric illnesses in Madness and Civilization--and to display their 
contingency, their constructedness, and how they have been shaped (at least to some 
extent) by power. This creates a space in which subjects can start to understand and to 
modify their own discourses and practices (Tully 2008a: 73-83).  The relevance of this 
approach to constitutional change  is apparent in Tully’s critique of liberal deliberation:  
 
When formerly excluded people are ‘included’ in practices of democratic 
deliberation, they often find that the practical knowledge of the practice is 
different from the ones to which they are accustomed. This is often overlooked by 
the dominant groups, for it is their customary way of reasoning together. ...If  
deliberation is oriented to a consensus, then, given reasonable disagreement, this 
will ensure that some minority voices will be silenced along the way.  Moreover, 
deliberation involves  a visceral or passionate dimension that was ignored in the 
more abstract accounts. (Tully 2008b: 116-118) 
 
 
Tully’s approach is used effectively to argue that marginalised groups such as 
First Nations can use this knowledge to ‘unblock processes of citizenisation’.  It does so 
without running into Coulthard’s objection to Benhabib, since the citizens engaged in 
practices of civic freedom are thereby enabled to affirm as well as modify existing rules 
and practices.  Similarly, Iris Marion Young's "communicative democracy", which values 
forms of communication that are non-deliberative, is also important to consider as a 
means of de-privileging dominant groups and attaining more meaningful democratic 
equality (Young 2000: 52-80). Young makes the distinction between ‘external exclusion’ 
(i.e. those issues that concern how people are kept outside the process of discussion and 
decision-making) and ‘internal exclusion’ (i.e. issues that concern  ways that people lack 
effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to 
for a and procedures of decision-making). According to Young, a theory of democratic 
inclusion  requires “an expanded conception of political communication, both in order to 
identify  modes of  internal inclusion and to provide an account  of more inclusive 
possibilities of attending  to one another in order to reach understanding”(56). In 
addition, Young’s ideal of differentiated solidarity is committed to wider regional 
institutions that both recognize group distinction, granting a prima-facie value to local 
autonomy, and require intergovernmental negotiation, mediation, joint planning and 
regulation (197-198; 228-235, emphasis added); hence its relevance to the politics of 
federalism and constitutional change. 
 
 
Bringing Institutions—and Politicians-- Back In 
 
In recent years, political elites in Canada have allowed increased participation by citizens 
by means of regular policy consultations, occasional mini-publics on constitutional 
matters, and occasional referenda, in response to the need for political legitimacy. These 
efforts have achieved little in terms of advancing either institutional reform or national 
unity, at least in part because they have not aimed at remedying the deliberative gap that  
often exists between representation and ratification.  Indeed, deliberative democrats are 
generally right to be “critical of the increasing use of initiatives, recall, and referenda, 
which typically take place under conditions that are even less deliberative than ordinary 
elections” (Gutmann & Thompson 2004: 60). It often appears  that  when results of  town 
hall meetings or other deliberative experiments are combined  with a referendum or 
plebiscite they do not enjoy a much higher rate of ratification—in other words, voters are 
not terribly impressed that their fellow citizens have deliberated about a proposed topic 
and are not especially deferential to the outcomes of deliberative mini-publics.. This fact 
has been echoed in Canada recently by the recent deliberative experiments in B.C.  and 
Ontario with respect to electoral reform  which saw the recommendations of Citizens’ 
Assemblies defeated  in the BC elections of 2005 and 2009 and the Ontario election. 
Such results should not be surprising, given the weak logical connections between 
deliberation and decision-making.”Deliberation must end in a decision, but deliberative 
democracy does not itself specify a single procedure for reaching a final decision. It must 
rely on other procedures, most notably voting, which in themselves are not deliberative.” 
(Gutmann and Thompson 2004:18).  Gutmann and Thompson’s example of the role of 
deliberation in the work of the Oregon Health Commission in the early 1990s at least 
exemplified the ‘reiteration of deliberation’  through successive stages of leader revision 
and citizen reaction, before ending in  a  majority vote in the legislature.  The contrasts 
with Canada’s recent experiments with citizen deliberation are instructive.   
 
First, the main premise underlying the constitution and selection of citizens’ 
assemblies in electoral reform matters was deemed to be  the  need to  overcome the 
problem of “conflict of interest” on the part of politicians, who had invested in political 
strategies for winning under the existing system  and who were therefore the greatest 
beneficiaries of that  system. But the requirement of a 60% supermajority threshold in 
both Ontario and BC   (which caused the BC vote of 57.69% to be defeated in 2005) was 
arguably also unnecessary and self-serving, notwithstanding the suggestion of a 
precedent in the Clarity Act.  Furthermore, the non-involvement of legislators in a 
process that put Citizens’ Assembly recommendations directly to the voters enabled them 
to avoid responsibility—and to subtly signal to the electorate that electoral reform was 
not a priority.(Fafard 2009: 193).  It is intriguing to speculate how provincial legislatures 
would have handled these bills if they had been treated as citizens’ initiatives, and 
politicians had been forced to publicly justify acceptance, rejection or amendment of 
these proposals.  Or, if these legislators had been forced to engage in civic dialogue with 
the Assembly,  in a manner similar to the Oregon process. 
Second, the experiences of the 2005, 2007 and 2009 provincial referenda on 
electoral reform raised doubts about the adequacy of the media as a forum for the 
deliberative conduct of referenda. Pilon’s study of the 2007 referendum campaign in 
Ontario suggests that democratic theory can be operationalized in order to evaluate the 
“deliberative performance” of various media outlets. Habermas’s inclusive and equal 
‘ideal speech’ situation  requires not only equal space and  broad inclusion but a “critical 
deliberative dynamic”. One way to test for the latter would be to look for different kinds 
of validity claims that participants make (meaning, knowledge, appropriateness and 
sincerity) and ask whether and to what degree leading media outlets  have managed to 
satsify them (Pilon 2009: 6 ). On these counts Pilon found five of the  leading daily 
newspapers  in Ontario to have been wanting. 
Third, there is a striking difference between the provisionality and open-ended 
nature of the more purely deliberative Oregon process and the finality of the  Citizens’ 
Assembly process, in which there were fixed terms of reference, little or  no reciprocal 
dialogue between citizens and elected representatives, and finally a decision in which 
citizens were ultimately faced with a ‘take-it-or leave-it  referendum decision.   Gutmann 
and Thompson cite as an example the growing sense of unfairness that many of the 
participants in Oregon felt about how rationing of health care services  would cause some 
resources to be transferred from some poor citizens to other poor citizens.  This led to a 
call for an increased health care budget that was beyond the terms of reference for 
deliberators at the community level—at first glance, a disadvantage of the deliberative 
approach.  But, since both citizens and legislators were then forced to confront the 
unfairness of the rationing scheme (an issue that they had previously evaded), the 
legislators then acted to increase the amount of resources so that no poor people would be 
made poorer as a consequence of the deliberations. Revisions were also made to the 
deliberative procedures themselves, so that the citizens most affected by the policy would 
be more adequately represented in the future (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 19-20). 
The difficulties confronting referendum democracy are of course compounded at 
the national level when the issues are inter-cultural relations and major constitutional 
amendments.  Several problems affecting any prospects for successful democratic 
constitutional change were said to  have emerged from Meech Lake and its sequel, the 
Charlottetown Accord: 1 ) the rise of  the Citizens’ constitution organized around Charter 
rights greatly complicated the ability of elites to engineer legitimating change;  2) the 
asymmetry between basically legitimate elite bargaining in Quebec( at least on 
federalism issues) and illegitimate elite bargaining in English Canada; 3) ratification by 
referendum has achieved a quasi-conventional status and may be unavoidable  with 
packages of amendments as large as Meech or Charlottetown; 4) Claims based upon 
differentiated equality (Eisenberg) or differentiated solidarity (Young) clashing with the 
ideals of  undifferentiated equality and national integration implicit in referendum 
democracy.  Since this  latter point has more  salience in some  institutional contexts than 
others—ranging from tolerably low in the case of Charter interpretation provisions to 
extremely high when it comes to the principle of representation by population in the 
House of Commons---- successful ratification of differential equality and solidarity 
claims may be possible if elites who negotiate constitutional texts are sufficiently 
sensitive to the democratic logics of different institutions. Such sensitivity, it is 
submitted, is more likely to evolve out of a process of iterative deliberation. 
 
It has been argued that deliberative democracy is more suited to the politics of 
difference than is either aggregative or plebiscatory democracy, not because it achieves 
harmony, but because it narrows disagreement to more acceptable levels and encourages 
mutual understanding and mutual recognition (Guttman & Thompson 1996, 2004). Of 
course , this assumption has been contested. There are conditions in which deliberation 
actually promotes disagreement and enhances conflict, because it makes citizens more 
aware of differences of interest( Shapiro 1999: 31).    Indeed, more radical versions of 
democratic theory (Dryzek’s discursive democracy,  Tully’s public philosophy, and 
Young’s communicative democracy) are compelling precisely because they serve to de-
legitimate dominant discourses  and encourage a greater multiplicity of conflicting 
discourses, which could in turn make the attainment of agreement (the prime and urgent  
objective of the Meech Lake negotiations, for example) even harder to achieve.   The 
evidence is mixed, suggesting that much depends on the institutional design.  Cass 
Sunstein has evidence showing a tendency toward polarization in smaller groups, 
particularly when those groups are relatively homogeneous and have a shared identity 
(Sunstein 2000).  However, he agrees with James Fishkin (1995) that “deliberative 
polling”—a procedure he developed for random sampling of citizens to discuss policy 
positions of competing candidates—tends to be de-polarizing, particularly when care is 
taken to ensure diversity in the group, an open process, and balanced information to the 
participants. A more controversial aspect of deliberate polls is that they are also private. 
Citizens juries and consensus conferences ask participants to come together to craft novel 
solutions to policy problems, and, according to Graham Smith, are more likely to produce 
creative solutions to problems (Smith 99-100). 
In the light of these considerations, there  are at least two  basic strategies that can 
followed to improve the democratic character of Canadian constitutional politics.  One is 
to make referenda campaigns themselves more deliberative—either by improved media 
coverage and better use of both old and new  media by governments and civic groups, 
structured citizen meetings at the local level, or procedures such as citizens’ juries and  
deliberative polling (Warren and Pearse 2008; Fishkin 1995).  The other is to avoid 
referenda wherever possible, focusing direct democracy more at the initiation or agenda-
setting stage and otherwise focusing on supplementing and improving existing  
representative bodies with deliberative devices, such as local popular assemblies, 
deliberative polling, and other mini-publics, with the ultimate ratification being provided 
by the legislature(s) (Smith 20009, Dryzek 2011).    
The first strategy, while showing both room for improvement and considerable 
promise, nonetheless has a disappointing track record.  The reasons for this have to do 
with the inherent time and resource limitations of referenda campaigns; the binary nature 
of referenda questions; the problems of scale which afflict the attempt to extend 
deliberation to a mass public, and the difficulty of revising either questions or answers  as 
deliberation evolves. Related to these factors  is the relative lack of institutional dialogue 
between  citizens’ bodies and the parliaments or legislatures. Governments have either 
been excessively zealous in loading and fixing the constitutional agenda (Charlottetown) 
or else have been conspicuously absent (electoral reform); in both cases there was no 
obvious means available of rectifying the flaws in the process.  The second strategy  
values ongoing, open-ended conversation rather than pinning the hopes for legitimacy 
and success on a single final decision. It provides forums for reiterative and interactive 
dialogue between citizens and their representatives which, instead of providing an escape 
from (or for) politicians, gives them a new deliberative role.  
Conclusion  
 
A re-examination of  the constitutional debates of two decades ago reveals a missed 
opportunity for deliberative dialogue, a misguided emphasis upon citizen ratification 
instead of  citizen initiative, and a lack of awareness of the conflict between the logics of 
deep diversity and plebiscitary democracy.  The evasion of democratic constitutionalism 
since 1987 has been characterized alternately by  the  two polarities of executive 
dominance and legislative absence, which share in common a desire  to achieve durable 
institutional legitimacy within a context of truncated conversation and debate.  Whether 
the objective has been national reconciliation in a rapidly evolving multi-national and 
multi-cultural community, or enhanced citizenship through democratic reform, the means 
have not been coherent with the ends. 
This failure of democratic practice has  had an unexpected and unwitting ally--- 
democratic theory.  Whether it is liberal constitutionalists placing exclusive faith in 
procedures; social constructivists placing too much faith on normative conditions 
designed to counter essentialism in identity formation; advocates of patriotism advocating 
expressive rules as the key to reconciliation; or radical pluralists’ understandable 
emphasis upon agonism in social practices, it has proven all too easy to overlook  the 
conjunction of two fundamental insights.  First, that there is a need to make  decisions 
about relatively stable rules, which in turn requires a “realist understanding of 
deliberation and of constitutional politics, as rule-bound debates defined by conflicts and 
by the possibility of accommodation” (Noel 2006: 435).  Second, that there is a need for 
an understanding, pace Wittgenstein  and  Cavell, that “we should never refuse bearing 
responsibility for our decisions by invoking the commands of general rules and 
principles” (Mouffe 2005: 76).   
Just as all of the aforementioned  strands of  democratic theory can fail us,  they  
also  can all contribute to a better understanding of how best to proceed.  There is by now 
broad theoretical agreement that attempts to find short cuts to legitimate constitutional 
settlements are likely to backfire; that there is a need to respect the  very different logics 
that different institutions possess, including the different conceptions of equality that they 
embody; that it is desireable wherever possible, to move away from the logic of strategic 
bargaining to the logic of mutual respect and recognition. More needs to be done, 
however, to establish the basic competencies of our most important democratic 
institutions.  Exactly what questions are best suited for a citizens’ assembly to deliberate 
about  as opposed to a legislature? Exactly what questions are best  decided by 
referendum as opposed to legislative vote?  These are the crucial questions that the 
politics of legitimation in Canada has largely avoided.  We can begin to answer them by 
noting that (1) Citizens’ Assemblies are well-suited to deliberating about concrete 
questions of fundamental importance that are not  or involving large re-allocations of 
resources from other policy areas; (2) referenda are good devices for registering approval 
or disapproval  on a one-person-one vote basis, but not for deliberating about complex 
“polycentric” policy questions; or making decisions where strict majoritarianism is not a 
consensus value; and (3) representative governments bring responsibility for over-all 
priority-seting and resource allocation  to the democratic dialogue. 
One simple, concrete suggestion: Consider sending citizen deliberative 
recommendations to politicians for ratification or amendment, instead of directly to the 
voters in referenda.   Forcing free parliamentary votes on the recommendations of 
citizens juries would encourage citizens to deliberate rather than simply ”choose”, and 
also place pressure on representatives to actually justify their decisions.   
Finally:  Continue the Constitutional Conversation.   If elite accommodation is no 
longer a sufficiently legitmate mechanism for constitutional change, popular participation 
is risky and nation-wide ratification elusive, what is to be done? In Canada several 
commentators have thoughtfully presented the case for a continuing “Canadian 
conversation” and in various ways have tried to argue that the focus of constitutional 
discussion should no longer be the imposition of a single fixed or permanent solution to 
the problems of civic identity and federal arrangments, but instead an ongoing openness 
to recognitions heretofore lacking, circumscribed only by the willingness to recognize 
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i “A great benefit of the country’s  exhaustion from dealing with big  packages of constitutional reform 
would be relearning how to do ordinary, one-reform-at-a-time, constitutional politics....Fortunately, there 
are some encouraging signs that  Canadians may be recovering the capacity to accomplish constitutional 
reform without linking everything together and getting bogged down in the mega constitutional swamp” 
(Russell 1993: 231). 
ii Swinton’s remarks included in a summary of the proceedings of “Symposium on Constitutional Reform: 
AfterAllaire and Bélanger-Campeau”, (Edmonton, Alberta, May 15-16, 1991), (1991) Constitutional 
Forum, Vol. 3, No. 1, p.17. 
 
iii  “Despite its shortcomings[a high order of communicative standards expected of citizens; a question of 
how best to develop the kinds of civic identity best suited for deliberation], there are good grounds for 
proposing that deliberative democratic theory offers the greater promise of renovating both  the practice of 
democratic citizenship and democratic institutions.” Geoffrey Stokes,  “Democracy and Citizenship” in 
Democratic Theory Today (2002). 
 
 
